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SHAPIRO, DANDRIDGE, AND RESIDENCE
REQUIREMENTS IN PUBLIC HOUSING
JOSEPH M. ELLIS*
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently the United States Supreme Court has been faced with the
question of the constitutionality of residence requirements imposed
by the states as a prerequisite for obtaining welfare benefits. The 1969
landmark decision of Shapiro v. Thompson' applied the "compelling
governmental interest" equal protection standard to such residency re-
quirements for public assistance. This standard made it easy for the
Court to strike down the requirement, and at first blush it appeared
that such requirements were on the way out. However, a few months
later, the Court may have revitalized the validity of these residency
requirements with its decision in Dandridge v. Williams.2 Although
that case involved maximum grant limitations, rather than residency
requirements, it is likely to have widespread ramifications in the
whole field of public assistance and welfare. By applying the "reason-
able basis" standard of equal protection, it now appears very difficult
for the Court to hold classifications which are likely to discriminate
against the poor as violative of the fourteenth amendment.
A more detailed examination of these decisions and their ramifica-
tions follows.
II. EQUAL PROTECTION STANDARDS: Shapiro AND Dandridge
In Shapiro the United States Supreme Court held that a durational
residence requirement, as a prerequisite to the receipt of public as-
sistance, was unconstitutional on two separate grounds. First, it
established a class of people who could not receive the same benefits
that other citizens received, and since there was no compelling state
interest requiring such classification, it was violative of the equal pro-
tection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Secondly, and perhaps
* B.A., University of Missouri at St. Louis, 1968; J.D., Washington University,
1971.
1. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
2. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
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most important, the Court held that the residence requirement in-
fringed on a constitutionally protected right to travel.
In reaching its decision, the Court rejected the appellants' conten-
tion "that a mere showing of a rational relationship between the wait-
ing period and . .. admittedly permissible state objectives . . .-
would support the classification. Rather, the Court held that there
must be some compelling governmental interest to support the classi-
fication.4 Mr. Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, stated:
The waiting-period provision denies welfare benefits to otherwise
eligible applicants solely because they have recently moved into
the jurisdiction. But in moving from State to State or to the
District of Columbia appellees were exercising a constitutional
right, and any classification which serves to penalize the exercise
of that right, unless shown to be necessary to promote a compel-
ling governmental interest, is unconstitutional.5
This broad statement seems to suggest, at the very least, that a du-
rational residence requirement of any sort will be unconstitutional
unless it is justified by a compelling governmental interest. A more
expansive reading would seem to suggest that any governmental ac-
tion which tends to penalize the exercise of the right to travel would
be unconstitutional unless supported by a compelling governmental
3. 394 U.S. at 634.
4. It is difficult to state precisely the origin of the compelling governmental
interest test. However, it is clear that it was recognized as early as 1944 when
the Supreme Court decided Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
In that case, Mr. Justice Black, speaking for the Court, stated:
It should be noted, to begin with, that all legal restrictions which curtail
the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect. That is not
to say that all such restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to say that courts
must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny. Pressing public necessity may
sometimes justify the existence of such restrictions; racial antagonism never
can.
Id. at 215.
Since that time the Court has applied the test on numerous occasions, primarily
in cases involving classifications based solely on race, but also in cases involving
voting rights and education. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184
(1964); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); and Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Finally, it is important to note the distinction between the traditional test and
the compelling governmental interest test. In the former, a classification must
have some reasonable relation to some legitimate state interest. In contrast, under
the latter theory, a classification need not be invidious to be declared invalid.
Furthermore, it can have some reasonable relation to some legitimate state interest
and, nevertheless, be invalid. See Note, Developments in the Law-Equal Protec-
tion, 82 HARv. L. Rv. 1065, 1130 (1969).
5. 394 U.S. at 634.
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interest. However, shortly after Shapiro, the Court decided Dandridge,
in which it upheld a "maximum grant"6 provision of the Maryland
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program, which
cast doubt on the extent of the holding in Shapiro.
In Dandridge, the appellees were AFDC recipients, who brought
an action to enjoin the use of the maximum grant regulation, con-
tending that it constituted an invidious discrimination against them
because they had large families and that it was, therefore, violative
of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Appel-
lants argued that the traditional equal protection test 7 should apply,
and under that test, the regulation was rationally supported and justi-
fied by several legitimate state interests, particularly in that it en-
couraged gainful employment. The lower court held that the regula-
tion was violative of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment," but the Supreme Court reversed, stating that:
In the area of economics and social welfare, a State does not
violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because the classifica-
tions made by its laws are imperfect. If the classification has
some "reasonable basis," it does not offend the Constitution sim-
p!y because the classification "is not made with mathematical
nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality." 9
Thus, in Dandridge, the Court returned to the traditional equal
protection test and apparently halted a trend toward full protection
of the poor through equal protection of the laws,O a position for which
6. Essentially, the AFDC regulations provide that a certain amount is paid for
each child, for instance $30.00 per month. However, this is then limited by a
maximum grant provision which provides, in effect, that the maximum amount
any one family may receive is, for example, $250.00 per month. Thus, a large
family would receive nothing for the tenth or greater child, and only $10.00 per
month for the ninth, because the maximum grant had been reached.
7. See Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911). Essentially,
the traditional test is that if there is some reasonable basis for the classification,
it will not be invalidated.
8. Dandridge v. Williams, 297 F. Supp. 450 (D. Md. 1968), rev'd, 397 U.S.
471 (1970).
9. 397 U.S. at 485.
10. It is interesting to note that Shapiro and Dandridge were decided during a
period when the Supreme Court was in turmoil. It could perhaps be argued that
the different make-up of the Court had an important bearing on the two decisions,
and may have caused the apparent difference in result. However, this the position
is difficult to support after analysis of the split in the decisions. In Shapiro,
Justice Brennan wrote the majority opinion, Justice Stewart wrote a separate con-
curring opinion, and Chief Justice Warren, and Justices Black and Harlan, dis-
sented. In Dandridge, Justice Stewart wrote the majority opinion; Justices Bren-
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several commentators had argued.11 It could perhaps be argued that
Dandridge was an isolated case, and that it has not stifled develop-
ment of a new constitutional protection of the poor. Such a conten-
tion could be supported by citing recent Supreme Court cases which
have held that it is a violation of equal protection to deny a person
a divorce solely because he cannot afford the court filing fees, 12 or to
imprison a person because he cannot pay a court-imposed fine. 3 How-
ever, even if this position is correct, the decision in Dandridge has
created confusion in the lower courts, and has made ambiguous what
was, perhaps, clear before. This confusion can be seen by reviewing
recent cases on one particular issue: whether a durational residence
requirement as a prerequisite to application for, and admission to,
public housing is constitutional.
III. HOUSING AND RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS
A. History
The national housing program began in earnest with the adoption
of the Public Housing Act of 1937.14 The Department of Housing
and Urban Development (HUD) administers the federal program,
and issues regulations and guidelines which local agencies must follow
if they wish to receive federal funding. However, local agencies re-
tain a great deal of responsibility in the administration of the pro-
gram.15 The local agencies have responsibility for the establishment
nan, Douglas, and Marshall dissented. Thus, Justice Stewart was in the majority
in both Shapiro and Dandridge.
The only difference in Court make-up was the position of Chief Justice. In
Shapiro, Chief Justice Warren, joined by Justice Black, dissented. In Dandridge,
Justice Black was joined by Chief Justice Burger in a separate concurring opinion.
Thus, the votes of Chief Justice Warren and Chief Justice Burger were consistent,
as were the votes of Justices Black, Harlan, Brennan, Douglas, and Marshall.
Justices Stewart and White were the swing votes and were, at least seemingly,
inconsistent.
11. See generally, Aloi & Goldberg, Racial and Economic Exclusionary Zoning:
The Beginning of the End?, 1971 URBAN L. ANN. 9; Michelman, Foreword: On
Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 H.Av. L. REv. 7
(1969); Note, Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. Rv.
1065 (1969).
12. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
13. Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971).
14. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1401-14 (1964). The Act has been amended on a number of
occasions, but most extensively in 1949 and 1959.
15. The Act's declaration of policy, as it presently reads, is as follows:
It is declared to be the policy of the United States to promote the general
welfare of the Nation by employing its funds and credit, as provided in this
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of eligibility requirements; 16 they often have created durational resi-
dence requirements. However, some local authorities have apparently
never established such requirements, while others have abandoned
them and still others continue to use them.17 The requirements can
be for any length of time, but they usually tend to be limited to one
or two years."" However, at least one local agency had a five year re-
quirement.19
The effect of a residence requirement as a prerequisite to admission
to public housing is obvious; it prevents newcomers from obtaining
public housing. More precisely, since wealthy immigrants usually do
not qualify for public housing and usually do not want it, it prevents
only poor newcomers from obtaining such housing.20
B. Non-federally Funded Projects
In King v. New Rochelle Municipal Housing Authority,21 plaintiff
brought an action to enjoin enforcement of the defendant's residence
requirement and for a declaratory judgment that the requirement
was unconstitutional. The requirement in question was established
by the defendant housing authority under a state statute which allowed
local agencies to adopt their own admission standards. The require-
ment provided that a family must have at least one member who had
chapter, to assist the several States and their political subdivisions to alleviate
present and recurring unemployment and to remedy the unsafe and unsanitary
housing conditions and the acute shortage of decent, safe, and sanitary dwell-
ings for families of low income, in urban, rural nonfarm, and Indian areas,
that are injurious to the health, safety, and morals of the citizens of the
Nation. In the development of low-rent housing it shall be the policy of the
United States to make adequate provisions for larger families and for families
consisting of elderly persons. It is the policy of the United States to vest in
the local public housing agencies the maximum amount of responsibility in
the administration of the low-rent-housing program, including responsibility
for the establishment of rents and eligibility requirements (subject to the
approval of the Authority), with due consideration to accomplish the objec-
tives of this Act while effecting economies.
Id. at § 1401.
16. Id.
17. See Shoshinski, Public Landlords and Tenants: A Survey of the Developing
Law, 1969 DuxE .J. 399, 421 n.98 (1969).
18. New York City Housing Authority-two years; Chicago Housing Authority
---one year; Boston Housing Authority-one year. Id.
19. See King v. New Rochelle Municipal Housing Authority, 314 F. Supp. 427,
428 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
20. Arguably the problem is irrelevant since nearly all local agencies have a
greater demand for such housing than they have supply, and therefore have long
waiting lists.
21. 314 F. Supp. 427 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
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been a resident of the city for five years before he could apply for ad-
mission to public housing. The project in question had been built
with state funds and was subsidized by the state, but it did not receive
federal funding; therefore, it was not subject to federal legislation.22
The district court held that, in light of Shapiro, the five year resi-
dence requirement was unconstitutional. The court went on to say
that "[a]lthough the Court [in Shapiro] expressed no view on the
validity of residence requirements other than of welfare benefits, it
referred to 'food, shelter, and other necessities of life.' "23
The defendant argued that the requirement did not deter inter-
state travel since it was merely a city requirement. In answer to this
argument, the court indicated that there was no distinction between
interstate and intrastate travel. District Judge Wyatt went on to state:
Defendants contend that unlike welfare payments public hous-
ing facilities are physically limited, and cannot be divided among
all eligible claimants. This purported distinction ignores the
thrust of plaintiffs' claim. Plaintiffs do not demand immediate
admission to public housing, nor do they contest the Authority's
undoubted power to establish a fair and orderly system of prior-
ities (including the use of waiting lists) among qualified appli-
cants. . . What is challenged, rather, is the distinction made
between applicants who have lived in New Rochelle for a shorter
period. In light of Shapiro, such a distinction is impermissible,
absent a compelling governmental interest.
No compelling interest has been suggested to support the dis-
crimination. It is argued that if all residents are accorded an
equal opportunity to apply for public housing, long-time resi-
dents whose present "life patterns" bind them to the community
will suffer because the waiting lists will increase. This purported
justification was rejected in Shapiro; the Court held impermissible
22. This fact is particularly important in light of some rather unclear dicta in
Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970). Rosado involved a claim by New York
AFDC recipients that the state had violated federal legislation by reducing its
payments. The Court held for the plaintiffs on purely statutory grounds but it
stated: "New York is, of course, in no way prohibited from using only state funds
according to what ever plan it chooses, provided it violates no provision of the
Constitution." Id. at 420.
This statement may mean just what it says, and nothing more; however, it may
imply that serious constitutional questions will be raised if a state refuses to pro-
vide any aid. Furthermore, it most certainly implies the obvious, i.e., that the
same constitutional standards apply to non-federally funded programs as do to
federal programs.
23. 314 F. Supp. at 431.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol1972/iss1/9
RESIDENCE REQUIREMENTS IN PUBLIC HOUSING
a state's interest in protecting its long time residents from a de-
crease in welfare benefits due to an influx of indigent new-
comers .... 24
Finally, the court held that, so far as public housing was concerned,
the existence or non-existence of federal funding was irrelevant to
application of the constitutional standard for residence requirements.25
Thus, King relied almost solely on Shapiro in holding that a dura-
tional residence requirement as a prerequisite to admission to purely
state funded public housing was unconstitutional. According to this
court and general principles of law,26 whether there is federal funding
is irrelevant to the problem.2 7
C. Federally Funded Projects
Cole v. Housing Authority of the City of Newport 8 was a class ac-
tion seeking "declaratory and injunctive relief against a two-year
durational residency requirement for admission to federally financed
public housing." 2, The defendant housing authority was a public
corporation, which owned and operated public housing projects fi-
nanced by the federal government and the City of Newport. Plaintiff
Cole was an unwed mother of two children; her only income was a
monthly AFDC check in the amount of $197.50. 0 At the time of the
suit, she was paying $110.00 monthly rent for a two room, non-pub-
licly owned apartment.31 She applied for public housing but was
rejected because she failed to meet the two year residence requirement.
The district court held that the residence requirement was invalid
on two grounds;: - first, that it violated the Federal Public Housing
Act,- and second, that it was unconstitutional under Shapiro. With
respect to the federal statute, the court stated:
Certainly, [42 U.S.C.] § 1401 seeks to preserve broad powers of
control, consistent with the statute, in local authorities in order
to carry out cooperative federalism, one of the underlying philoso-
24. Id.
25. See note 22 supra.
26. See Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 420 (1970).
27. It should be noted that King was decided almost three months after the
decision in Dandridge.
28. 312 F. Supp. 692 (D.R.I.), aff'd, 435 F.2d 807 (1st Cir. 1970).
29. Id. at 694.
30, Id. at 695.
31. Id.
32. This decision was rendered only ten days after the ruling in Dandridge, and
therefore it is unlikely that Dandridge was considered.
33. 42 U.S.C. § 1401-14 (1964).
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phies of the statute. However, the eligibility requirements re-
erred to in § 1401 most probably include those specifically defined
in § 1402 (1). Nowhere in the act is it indicated that residency
requirements of a durational sort are permissible means of "effect-
ing economies." Nowhere in the considerable legislative history
of the federal housing laws are durational residency requirements
even mentioned.... Given this silence and the indisputable fact
that residency requirements frustrate the purposes of the Act
by denying otherwise qualified low-income persons access to pub-
lic housing and by lessening applicant pressure and thereby lessen-
ing pressure to clear slums and build still further public housing,
the court is persuaded that the regulation must be declared vio-
lative of the statute.84
After reaching this conclusion, the district court, nevertheless, went
on to hold that the requirement was unconstitutional, relying on
Shapiro.85 The defendants argued that the residence requirement
involved did not fall within the ruling in Shapiro. They contended
that it did not infringe on plaintiffs' right to travel because most
people in the city satisfied their need for housing by resorting to the
private market; thus, if private housing was available in the city, the
Newport Housing Authority was not hindering plaintiffs' right to
travel. The court dismissed this contention as sheer sophistry, stating,
inter alia, that "the private market is inadequate as a matter of law.8s
(Emphasis added) The court relied on a federal statute, 7 a state
34. 312 F. Supp. at 695-96.
35. Id. at 703. Justice Brandeis, in his concurring opinion in Ashwander v.
TVA, 297 U.S. 288 (1936), stated:
The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly
presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which
the case may be disposed of.... Thus, if a case can be decided on either of
two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a question of
statutory construction or general law, the Court will decide only the latter.
Id. at 347.
Although this is not an iron-clad rule, and although the Supreme Court itself
often does not follow it when it feels that it is important not to, it would seem
that it would nevertheless apply to lower federal courts.
36. 312 F. Supp. at 697.
37. 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1964) provides:
The Congress declares that the general welfare and security of the Nation and
the health and living standards of its people require housing production and
related community development sufficient to remedy the serious housing short-
age, the elimination of substandard and other inadequate housing through
the clearance of slums and blighted areas, and the realization as soon as feasi-
ble of the goal of a decent home and a suitable living environment for every
American family, thus contributing to the development and redevelopment
of communities and to the advancement of the growth, wealth, and security
of the Nation.
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statute,-" and a Newport city council resolution,39 all of which indi-
cated, in one way or another, that the private market was not meeting
the housing needs of the nation, state, or city.
The court concluded that the Newport residence requirement was
almost identical to that in Shapiro in that it applied to an essential
of life, it inhibited freedom of travel, and it served only one purpose,
discouraging in-migration of the poor to the area.40
Although the Cole and King decisions appear to presume that the
compelling governmental interest, equal protection standard applies
in public housing residence requirement cases, it would seem that this
is subject to question; this may, in fact, be the most crucial issue in
the cases. 41 The Supreme Court has suggested that laws which tend
to penalize or inhibit the exercise of constitutional rights will be
viewed with suspicion.42 If a durational residence requirement as a
prerequisite to admittance to public housing does not penalize or
inhibit the right to travel (or other constitutional rights), the tra-
ditional equal protection standard should apply, and it may be that
such a requirement is rationally related to a legitimate state interest,
even if it is not justified by a compelling governmental need.43 In
Dandridge, the Supreme Court apparently concluded that no con-
stitutional right was being penalized or inhibited by the maximum
grant regulation, and that the traditional standard should apply. This
38. RJ. GEN. LAws ANN. § 45-25-2 (1956) provides:
It is hereby declared that unsanitary or unsafe dwelling accommodations exist
in various cities of the state . . . ; that these conditions cannot be remedied
by the ordinary operations of private enterprises ....
39. Newport City Council Resolution No. 473, Resolution Authorizing and
Directing Submission of Application for Reservation of Low-rent Housing and for
a Preliminary Loan Authorizing Co-operation Agreement, quoted in 312 F. Supp.
at 698:
Whereas the Housing Authority of the City of Newport, Rhode Island has
found and hereby determines that there is a need for low-rent housing to meet
needs not being adequately met by private enterprise within its area of opera-
tion.
40. Id. at 703.
41. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), where the court suggested
that some residence requirements might be valid because they were either justified
by a very crucial state interest or did not penalize the right to travel. Id. at 638
n.21.
42. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
43. A careful reading of Cole may lead one to believe that the court found no
rational relationship between the residence requirement and any legitimate state
interest. At best, the decision is unclear on this point.
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would seem to support the contention that the applicable standard
is the crucial issue.44
In Lane v. McGarry,45 the district court held that a one year resi-
dence requirement as a prerequisite to application for public housing
in Syracuse, New York, was not violative of the equal protection
clause or the plaintiffs' right to freedom of association under the first
amendment of the United States Constitution. In so holding, the
court placed primary consideration on the applicable equal protection
standard and concluded that the traditional standard should apply.
In reaching this conclusion, the court stated:
While theoretically, any durational residential classification
could be found to have an effect on the right to travel, i. e. some
one or few persons might refrain from traveling because of it,
such classification does not necessarily result in a penalty being
imposed "upon the exercise of the constitutional right of interstate
travel."
The insubstantiality of the impact of the classification on the
right to travel is a factor to be considered in determining whether
that right is being penalized .... To construe the impact of the
resolution in issue here as anything other than insubstantial is
fanciful and "far more theoretical than real."40 (Footnotes omit-
ted)
The court quoted at length from Dandridge, particularly the lan-
guage to the effect that in areas of "economic and social welfare,"
the traditional equal protection standard applies.47 The court con-
cluded that the residence requirement was reasonably justified because
it gave preference to those whose work and life patterns bound them
to the area.48 The court also held that the requirement was not viola-
tive of the United States Housing Act.49 Finally, the court cited Cole
and stated that it was "constrained to respectfully differ from it."GO
In developing its rationale, it would appear that Lane relied pri-
44. Although the Court in Dandridge did not discuss it, equal protection of the
laws is a constitutional right. Therefore, any state action which tends to penalize
or inhibit it would be viewed with suspicion, and state action which denies one
state aid equivalent to that received by others would require justification by a
compelling governmental interest.
45. 320 F. Supp. 562 (N.D.N.Y. 1970).
46. Id. at 564.
47. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
48. This is essentially the same argument rejected in Cole and King.
49. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1401-14 (1964).
50. 320 F. Supp. at 564.
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marily on Chief Justice Warren's dissenting opinion in Shapiro and
the majority position in Dandridge. It may be argued that it put too
much emphasis on a dissenting opinion, and in so doing failed to ap-
ply the law as developed in Shapiro. However, the Lane court ap-
parently recognized that the Supreme Court may have done the same
thing in Dandridge.
There is one final decision that must be considered, that of the First
Circuit Court of Appeals affirming the district court decision of Cole
v. Housing Authority of the City of Newport.5 1
Unlike the district courts in Cole and King, the court of appeals
here found the question of what equal protection standard to apply
to be the crucial issue. The court dealt at length with this issue and
developed a very tightly reasoned interpretation of Shapiro. Recog-
nizing that the Court in Shapiro did not make clear the "amount of
impact" that a residence requirement must have on the right to travel
before it must be justified by a compelling governmental interest, the
court concluded "that Shapiro stands for the proposition that a rule
penalizing travel requires a justification of a compelling state inter-
est." 2 It went on to find that the term "travel" was used "in the
sense of migration with intent to settle and abide."'5 3 This interpre-
tation would allow requirements which comparatively disadvantage
those who travel to a state to take advantage of benefits and have no
intent to remain. Thus, the court concluded that the two-year resi-
dence requirement penalized the right to travel, and therefore must
be justified by a compelling governmental interest.
Although the housing authority apparently abandoned the conten-
tions it had made in the lower court, and argued the illusionary value
of residence requirements,14 the court nevertheless concluded that
51. 435 F.2d 807 (lst Cir. 1970).
52. Id. at 810.
53. Id. at 811.
54. The court stated:
This argument .... proceeds on the assumption that the presence or absence
of a durational residency prerequisite for eligibility for public housing has in
fact nothing to do with the motivation of people to migrate. But it neverthe-
less asserts that the voters feel that abolition of the requirement will serve as
a magnet and that therefore they will vote down new applications if they think
that newcomers will benefit to the prejudice of long-time residents. We are
confronted with the assertion that if the two-year durational requirement were
declared invalid, "voters in city governments elsewhere as well as at Newport
would simply not approve new low-income public housing." Thus, the pur-
pose and effect of the requirement are not to impair the right to travel, but
to make the voters think the right to travel is being impaired, even though it
iq not.
Id. at 812.
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there was no compelling governmental interest in a durational resi-
dence requirement as a prerequisite to application and admission to
public housing.
Although it is only dicta and not a justification for the decision,
the following statement of the court is perhaps indicative of the prob-
lem and the policy considerations that enter into its resolution.
Even by a standard of rational relationship to a permissible
goal, we doubt that the justifications put forth by the Authority
could withstand judicial scrutiny. The goal of preventing an in-
flux of outsiders is constitutionally impermissible. The residency
requirement is not rationally related to the goal of planning.
The objective of achieving political support by discriminatory
means or by nourishing an illusion that means discriminate is not
one which the Constitution recognizes. Nor do we believe the
goal of promoting provincial prejudices toward long-time resi-
dents is cognizable under a Constitution which was written partly
for the purpose of eradicating such provincialism. Certainly none
of these interests counterbalances the fundamental individual
right involved.55
It should be noted that the court is suggesting that even under the
traditional equal protection standard, it is doubtful that the resi-
dence requirement could be upheld. And finally, the court's com-
ments on provincialism are important for the light they shed on other
housing problems.58
IV. CONCLUSION
In Bower v. Vaughan,57 the Supreme Court upheld a lower court
decision invalidating an Arizona law which allowed the director of a
state mental hospital to return patients to their state of former resi-
dence if they had not lived in Arizona for at least one year. In addi-
tion, a North Carolina district court struck down a durational resi-
dence requirement for the state bar examination,,; and a Florida
55. Id. at 813.
56. See Kit-Mar Builders, Inc., v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 439 Pa. 466, 268
A.2d 765 (1970); National Land & Investment Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 215
A.2d 597 (1965). Both Kit-Mar and National Land involved the problems of
exclusionary zoning, where the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania suggested that we
must move away from provincialism and think in terms of regionalism. See also
Aloi & Goldberg, Racial and Economic Exclusionary Zoning: The Beginning of
the End?, 1971 URBAN L. ANN. 9.
57. 400 U.S. 884 (1970), aff'g 313 F. Supp. 37 (D. Ariz. 1970).
58. Keenan v. North Carolina Board of Law Examiners, 317 F. Supp. 1350(E.D.N.C. 1970).
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district court held invalid a similar requirement imposed as a prere-
quisite to free medical care.5 9
In the field of public housing residence requirements, Cole and
King clearly stand for the proposition that Shapiro is the most closely
analagous governing principle. On the other hand, Lane stands for
the proposition that Dandridge can be read as limiting Shapiro. It
may be argued that since Dandridge did not involve the right to
travel,", it is being misread when it is applied to the residence require-
ment situation. Nevertheless, there is language in the case which
can be read in such a way as to be directly applicable to residence
requirements which lessens considerably the justification necessary to
support such a requirement.
When the Court's recent affirmance in Bower is considered along
with the Court's willingness to break new ground in the field of "wel-
fare" law, ' it seems clear that Dandridge must have been a unique
and isolated case. However, Dandridge is on the books and it will be
up to the Supreme Court to clarify the confusion that it has created.
59. Arnold v. Halifax Hospital District, 314 F. Supp. 277 (M.D. Fla. 1970).
60. At least, it did not involve the right to travel to the extent, or as directly,
as did Shapiro.
61. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S.
397 (1970); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
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